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We use a panel of 16 OECD countries over several decades to investigate the eﬀects of gov-
ernment debts and de￿cits on long-term interest rates. In simple static speci￿cations, a
one-percentage-point increase in the primary de￿cit relative to GDP increases contempora-
neous long-term interest rates by about 10 basis points. In a vector autoregression (VAR),
the same shock leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years. The
eﬀect of debt on interest rates is non-linear: only for countries with above-average levels of
debt does an increase in debt aﬀect the interest rate. World ￿scal policy is also important: an
increase in total OECD-government borrowing increases each country￿s interest rates. How-
ever, domestic ￿scal policy continues to aﬀect domestic interest rates even after controlling
for worldwide debts and de￿cits.
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  After years of fiscal consolidation in the 1990s, governments of many OECD 
countries have again embarked on expansionary fiscal policies. In 2003, the US 
government deficit reached 4.5 percent of GDP, compared with 1.5 percent in 2000, and 
is projected to increase further in the future. Over the same period, Germany’s deficit rose 
to 3.75 percent of GDP from 1 percent; France’s to 3.5 compared with 1.5, and Italy’s to 
2.5 from 0.75 percent; as a result, the Stability and Growth Pact has come under strain, 
possibly weakening the resistance to larger deficits in Europe in the future. 
  One of the main concerns raised by governments’ increased fiscal laxity is its 
effect on long-term interest rates. Undergraduate macroeconomic textbooks teach that 
budget deficits push interest rates up, leading to decreased investment and growth in the 
long-run. However, many economists and policymakers have argued that more 
sophisticated theorizing leads to less dire predictions, if not to an outright reversal of the 
textbook story, or that the quantitative significance of the effect is likely to be small.  
The empirical literature on the effects of fiscal imbalances on interest rates has 
reached inconclusive results as well. Estimates of the impact of debts and deficits on 
interest rates vary widely and there is no robust evidence that fiscal deficits and the 
accumulated public debt affect interest rates. Almost all of this work, however, is based 
on time series evidence from single countries, typically the US.   
In this paper, we examine the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates in a broad 
panel of 16 OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002. The 
results indicate statistically and economically significant effects of fiscal imbalances on 
long-term interest rates. In our preferred specification, a one percentage point increase of 
the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 10-basis-point rise in the nominal 
interest rate on 10-year government bonds. The increase is larger when one also considers 
the effect that a positive shock to the primary deficit has on expected future fiscal policy 
and macro variables in the long-run: in a dynamic VAR a one percentage point increase 
in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis 
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November 2004In addition to the current deficit, we examine the implications of changes in the 
stock of public debt. We find that the effect is non-linear becoming positive and 
statistically significant as a country’s debt grows.  
We also find that a worsening of public finances abroad has an effect on national 
interest rates, which is evidence that OECD countries’ financial markets are to some 
extent internationally integrated. However, the degree of globalization is far from 
complete: controlling for the average value of the primary deficit and public debt to GDP 
ratios across OECD countries, a shock to each country’s primary balance still affects 
national long-term interest rates. In a similar vein, we investigate whether the impact of 
fiscal variables on interest rates is more severe in financially less developed countries, 
and we find some evidence to this effect. 
  These results imply that the return to fiscal laxity that has taken place in several 
major industrial countries in recent years is potentially worrisome. Fiscal policy has 
important effects at the worldwide level, but it also has important effects at the level of 
the individual country. This suggests that, while each country’s fiscal imbalance has its 
greatest impact at home, it is also a legitimate concern at the level of the world economy. 
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After years of ￿scal consolidation in the 1990s, governments of many OECD countries have
again embarked on expansionary ￿scal policies. In 2003, the US government de￿cit reached
4.5 percent of GDP, compared with 1.5 percent in 2000, and is projected to increase further
in the future. Over the same period, Germany￿s de￿cit rose to 3.75 percent of GDP from 1
percent; France￿s to 3.5 compared with 1.5, and Italy￿s to 2.5 from 0.75 percent; as a result,
the Stability and Growth Pact has come under strain, possibly weakening the resistance to
larger de￿cits in Europe in the future.
One of the main concerns raised by governments￿ increased ￿scal laxity is its eﬀect
on long-term interest rates. Undergraduate macroeconomic textbooks teach that budget
de￿cits push interest rates up, leading to decreased investment and growth in the long-run.
However, many economists and policymakers have argued that more sophisticated theorizing
leads to less dire predictions, if not to an outright reversal of the textbook story, or that the
quantitative signi￿cance of the eﬀect is likely to be small.1 Given that theory does not settle
the matter (as it rarely does) the focus now is on empirical evidence.
The eﬀects of ￿scal imbalances on interest rates have been the subject of an extensive
but hiterto inconclusive empirical literature.2 However, estimates of the impact of debts and
de￿cits on interest rates vary widely.3 Almost all of this work is based on time series evidence
from single countries, typically the US. This suggests that there may be signi￿cant bene￿ts
1See Barth et al. (1991) and Gale and Orszag (2002) for a comprehensive review of the literature.
2An incomplete list includes Barro (1987), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), Blanchard and Summers
(1984), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), Evans (1985) and (1987), Hoelscher (1986), Laubach (2003),
Miller and Russek (1991) and (1996), Orr et al. (1995), Paesani and Strauch (2003), Perotti (2002), Plosser
(1987), Reinhart and Sack (2000), and Tavares and Valkanov (2003).
3Coeﬃcients of ￿scal policy variables in interest rates regressions span from being positive and signi￿cant
to being insigni￿cant. For example, while Hoelscher (1986) ￿nds that in the US each 100 billion dollars of
federal de￿cit increases the 10-year Treasury bonds interest rate by about 143 basis points, Evans (1987) ￿nds
that eurocurrency rates are not sensitive to changes in the ￿scal stance in Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
the UK and the US. More recently, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) show that in the US an increase
in projected future de￿cit by one percentage point of GDP leads to an increase in long-term interest rates
relative to the short-term interest rate from 53 to 60 basis points. This result is also supported by Laubach
(2003) who ￿nds that a one percentage point surge in the projected de￿cit-to-GDP ratio raises long-term
interest rates in the US by about 25 basis points. To the contrary, in a VAR framework, Mountford and
Uhlig (2000) do not ￿nd a permanent eﬀect of de￿cit shocks on short-term interest rates, and Perotti (2002)
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paper.
We examine the eﬀects of ￿scal policy on interest rates in a broad panel of 16 OECD
countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002. The results indicate statistically
and economically signi￿cant eﬀects of ￿scal imbalances on long-term interest rates. In our
preferred speci￿cation, a one percentage point increase of the primary de￿cit-to-GDP ratio
is associated with a 10-basis-point rise in the nominal interest rate on 10-year government
bonds. The increase is larger when one also considers the eﬀect that a positive shock to the
primary de￿cit has on expected future ￿scal policy and macro variables in the long-run: in
a dynamic VAR a one percentage point increase in the primary de￿cit-to-GDP ratio leads
to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years.
In addition to the current de￿cit, it is important to examine the implications of
changes in the stock of public debt. We ￿nd that the eﬀe c ti sn o n - l i n e a ra n dt h a tt h e
response of long-term interest rates is positive and statistically signi￿cant only when the
stock of public debt is above a given threshold. While in a country with a debt-to GDP ratio
of 119 per cent (Italy in 2002) a one-standard-deviation increase in government debt leads
to an increase in the nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds of about 36 basis
points, an increase by the same amount where the public debt-to-GDP ratio is 58 percent
(the US in 2002) leads to a 5 basis points decrease in the interest rate.4
We also ￿nd that a worsening of public ￿nances abroad has an eﬀect on national
interest rates, which is evidence that OECD countries￿ ￿nancial markets are to some extent
internationally integrated. However, the degree of globalization is far from complete: con-
trolling for the average value of the primary de￿cit and public debt to GDP ratios across
OECD countries, a shock to each country￿s primary balance still aﬀects national long-term
interest rates.5 In a similar vein, we investigate whether the impact of ￿scal variables on in-
terest rates is more severe in ￿nancially less developed countries, and we ￿nd some evidence
to this eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
econometric technique used in the estimation. Section 3 investigates the relation between
4Note, however, that the ratio of government debt to GDP has a standard deviation equal to 26 per cent,
hence a one-standard-deviation increase in the public debt is quite a substantial change. The response of
interest rates to a one percent change of the stock of public debt to GDP ratio would be really minimal,
even in countries with extreme low or high values of public debt.
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empirical analysis of our benchmark speci￿cations and checks the robustness of the results.
Section 4 presents estimates from dynamic VAR models. The last section concludes.
2D a t a a n d M e t h o d
In this section we describe the data we use in the empirical analysis, discuss the choice of
the variables of interest, and investigate the time-series properties of the variables.
The paper uses yearly data on OECD countries covering a maximum time span from
1960 to 2002. The countries included in the sampl ea r e :A u s t r a l i a ,A u s t r i a ,B e l g i u m ,C a n a d a ,
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. All ￿scal and macroeconomic data are from
the OECD Economic Outlook n.73, June 2003. Data on interest rates on 3-month Treasury
bills and on 10-year government bonds are from Global Financial Data; data on 10-year
interest rates on swap contracts are from Bloomberg. Data on ￿nancial development are
from the World Bank database on Financial Development and Structure.6
Since the objective is to isolate the eﬀects of ￿scal policy on interest rates, we use
a long-term bond rate as the dependent variable. A long-term rate re￿ects market condi-
tions, including in￿ationary expectations, in contrast to short-term rates which are heavily
in￿uenced by current monetary policy. We focus on the nominal interest rate on 10-year
government bonds (INT10Y ) because OECD countries in the sample have been issuing
this type of long-term bond for many years and, hence, long time-series of this variable are
available.7
Our key indicators of the ￿scal stance refer to the general government and are the pri-
mary de￿cit as a share of GDP (PRDEF) and the public debt as a share of GDP (GDEBT1
or GDEBT2). We use the primary de￿cit, rather than the total de￿cit, because it strips out
the direct eﬀect of interest rates on expenditure, thus better capturing autonomous changes
in ￿scal policy. We use two measures of government debt, GDEBT1o rGDEBT2, which
6T h ed a t a b a s ei sa v a i l a b l eo nl i n ea t
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/￿nstructure/database.htm.
7The results are robust if, instead, the long-term interest rate series from the OECD, which is an average
of the interest rates of long-term bonds of diﬀerent maturities, is used as the dependent variable. The results
also stand up if the spread between the 10-year government bonds interest rate and the 3-month Treasury
bills interest rate is taken as the dependent variable, and if both rates are entered in real terms.
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debt measured at the end of period t-1 divided by the level of GDP in year t-1. GDEBT2
is constructed following the approach in Levine et al (2002). It is a year-average debt stock
(i.e. the average of the stock of public debt in year t-1 and in year t divided by GDP in year
t) which insulates the debt ratio from within-year in￿ation.
Relative to other contributions in the literature our speci￿cation is slightly unusual,
in that it includes both the de￿cit and the debt. Our reason for doing so is that in theory
the relationship between ￿scal policy and interest rates may be mediated by either variable.
Textbook IS-LM accounts tend to emphasize the de￿cit, while microfounded general equi-
librium models tend to place more weight on the stock of debt. Furthermore, even if one
were speci￿cally interested in the eﬀects of only one of these variables, it would still make
sense to control for the other. For example, given the current stock of debt, including the
de￿cit may help controlling for the expected future path of the debt itself. Finally, including
both variables will allow us to study interactions among them. For example, some of our
speci￿cations are designed to assess whether the eﬀect of de￿cits depends on the level of
debt.
To achieve identi￿cation we mainly follow the well-worn path of adding relevant con-
trol variables. The chief concern, of course, is to hold monetary policy constant. To this
end, in all our speci￿cations we include the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury
bills (INT3M)a n dt h ei n ￿ation rate (INFL).8 We also control for the GDP growth rate
(GROWTH) and for global indicators of world ￿scal imbalances. We typically also have a
full set of country and year dummies. Finally, we use instrumental variables to allow for the
possible endogeneity of ￿scal policy associated with the government reaction function.
2.1 Time Series Properties and Estimation Technique
The stationarity properties of nominal interest rates (on 10-year government bonds and
3-month Treasury bills), the in￿ation rate, and the primary balance and public debt as
a share of GDP were examined using the unit root test for panel data proposed by Im,
8In principle, this may lead us to underestimate the eﬀect of ￿scal shocks on interest rates, if such
shocks impact the in￿ation rate and short-term rates directly or through the monetary authority￿s reaction
function (see Canzoneri et al. (2002)). When we regress the three-month interest rate on our ￿scal variables,
however, we ￿nd no eﬀect. Also, we show below that in a VAR that includes both short and long-term rates
the impact eﬀect of ￿scal shocks on long-term rates is similar in magnitude to the one implied by the simple
static regression that controls for short-term rates.
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stationarity when we use the sample from 1960 till 2002 (Sample A, from now on), it is
in favor of stationarity if we consider data from 1975 onwards (Sample B). This holds for
all variables except for the two variables that measure the stock of public debt as a share
of GDP, GDEBT1a n dGDEBT2. In fact, the test result does not allow us the reject the
null hypothesis that GDEBT1i sI(1) in both samples, but it suggests that GDEBT2i s
a stationary variable in Sample A and Sample B. This mixed evidence on the order of
integration of the series may well be due to the presence of structural breaks in the data
around the oil-shock and to the inability of the test used to distinguish it from the presence
of a unit-root. For this reason, we prefer not to choose any of the two types of results and
we will estimate our speci￿cations for both samples, using, in each case, the appropriate
econometric technique.
For Sample A, we also test whether the nominal interest rate on 10-year government
bonds, the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills, the in￿ation rate, the primary
de￿cit to GDP ratio, and the public debt to GDP ratio, as measured by GDEBT1, are
cointegrated using the tests suggested by Pedroni (1999) on the panel. The evidence allows
us to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are not cointegrated (see Table 1, part II).
Hence, based on the results shown in Table 1, we estimate our models in levels. We
always include country ￿xed eﬀects, and linear and quadratic trends or year ￿xed eﬀects.
When Sample A is used, we estimate the relation among the long-term interest rate, the
short-term interest rate, the in￿ation rate and the ￿scal policy variables by dynamic GLS,
because OLS standard errors are not valid when variables are cointegrated. More precisely,
in models using Sample A, we allow for heterosckedasticity and ￿rst order autocorrelation
in the error term and include among the regressors the contemporaneous diﬀerences of the
right-hand side variables. Both the autocorrelation coeﬃcient and the coeﬃcients of the
contemporaneous diﬀerences of the right-hand side variables are allowed to be country-
speci￿c.10 When we use Sample B, models are estimated by OLS and standard errors are
9When the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was applied to data for each country, the results permit-
ted rejection of the presence of a unit root for many, but not all, countries in the sample. The Im, Pesaran,
and Shin test is preferred given the low power of the ADF in small samples and the desirability of adopting
t h es a m ed y n a m i cs p e c i ￿cation for the entire panel.
10Stock and Watson (1993), and Mark and Sul (2002) suggest including contemporaneous, leads and lags
values of the diﬀerences of the right-hand side variables among the regressors and to allow the coeﬃcients
of these variables to be country speci￿c. Due to the number of observations required to estimate many
country￿s speci￿cc o e ﬃcients, we follow Schiantarelli et al. (1999) in including only the contemporaneous
diﬀerences of the right-hand side variables and allow for an AR(1) error term. Results are, however, very
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addition to linear and quadratic trends or year ￿xed eﬀects) yields consistent estimates since
we have a panel with large T.
3 Static Estimates
3.1 Linear Speci￿cation
Table 2 columns 1-3 and 5-7 shows the results of multivariate regressions of the nominal
interest rate on 10-year government bonds, on the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury
bills, the in￿ation rate, and the primary balance and public debt as a share of GDP. In
columns 4 and 8 we also add the rate of growth of GDP among the rhs variables. The
table shows that there is a positive relationship between the primary de￿cit as a share of
GDP and the 10-year government bonds interest rate. Independently of the sample used
and the control variables included in the estimation, the coeﬃcient of the primary de￿cit
is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. The size of the coeﬃcient, however,
varies across speci￿cations from 0.136 to 0.074, implying that a one percentage point increase
in the primary de￿cit to GDP ratio is associated with an increase of the 10-year government
bonds interest rate from a maximum of 13.6 basis points to a minimum of 7.4 basis points.
On the other hand, in all but one speci￿cation (Table 2, column 4), we do not ￿nd
a positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between long-term interest rates and the
stock of public debt as a share of GDP. In one speci￿cation (Table 2, column 1) the coeﬃcient
of GDEBT1 is even negative and statistically signi￿cant, suggesting that a one percentage
point increase in the stock of public debt as a share of GDP is associated with a decrease of
one basis point of the 10-year government bonds interest rate.
3.2 Non-linearities
We are not the ￿rst ones to ￿nd evidence of a negative relation between the stock of public
debt and long-term interest rates. Caporale and Williams (2002) interpret a negative coeﬃ-
cient as due to a portfolio eﬀect. When governments issue bonds and investors consider them
of high quality, they switch into them from bad quality debt. The price of such bonds goes
12
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bonds are risky and of low quality. What this suggests is that the relation between long-term
interest rates and the stock of public debt can be non-linear and depend, for example, on the
level of the debt. When the stock of debt is low, ￿nancial markets consider it of high quality
and an increase in its level is associated with a fall in interest rates. However, when gov-
ernment debt reaches a given threshold, further increases are associated with higher interest
rates.
Following this line of argument, we investigate the presence of nonlinearities in Table
3. Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 introduce among the regressors of Table 2 the square terms of
the primary de￿cit and of the public debt to GDP ratios. We ￿nd evidence of non-linearities
in the de￿cit in Sample A but not in Sample B. Given that we tend to consider estimates
from the latter sample more reliable because all variables included in the regression have the
same order of integration, we do not put too much emphasis on this result.11 On the other
hand, we ￿nd strong evidence of non-linearity in the public debt in both samples. An increase
in the public debt-to-GDP ratio has a negative eﬀect on long-term interest rates if the ratio
is below 62.5% for the speci￿cation in column 1 and below 65.4% for the one in column
5. The eﬀect of becomes positive when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above these thresholds
values. Using the coeﬃcients in column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of
government debt to GDP (i.e. standard deviation of GDEBT =0 .26) is associated with
a decrease of the 10-year government bonds rate by 73 basis points when government debt
is at its minimum value in sample (i.e. GDEBT =0 .12) but with an increase by 94 basis
points if the government debt is at its maximum value in sample (i.e. GDEBT =1 .41).
Columns 2-4 and 6-8 check for non-linear variants to the simple quadratic term in
columns 1 and 5. In particular, the idea is to see whether the relation between long-term
interest rates and ￿scal variables changes above a threshold level of the ￿scal variables. To
this end, we de￿ne two dummy variables, D1a n dD2, equal to one if the primary de￿cit-
to-GDP ratio and, respectively, the public debt-to-GDP ratio are above their median values
in the sample (and equal to zero otherwise).12 We then interact the dummy variables with
the square of the diﬀerence between the primary de￿cit and its median value in the sample
(PRDEF−PRDEF∗), and the square of the diﬀerence between public debt and its median
11Tests results presented in section 2.1 suggested that all variables included in the speci￿cations using
Sample A, except GROWTH, are I(1) and cointegrated. GROWTH is, however, I(0).
12The median value of the primary de￿cit to GDP ratio is -0.001 in Sample A and 0.001 in Sample B.
The median value of the government debt to GDP ratio is 0.59 in Sample A and 0.61 in Sample B.
13
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clear nonlinearity in the size of the debt, while ￿ at least in Sample B ￿t h ep r i m a r yd e ￿cit
continues to enter only linearly. Finally, in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 we check whether the
eﬀect of de￿cits depends on the level of debt and vice-versa. Results suggest that increases
of the primary de￿cit to GDP ratio have a bigger and statistically signi￿cant eﬀect (at the
10% level or better) on long-term interest rates when the public debt to GDP ratio is above
its median value. Instead, we ￿nd evidence that the eﬀect of public debt on interest rates
depends on the level of the primary de￿cit in Sample A, but not in Sample B.
3.3 Instrumental Variables
Table 4 addresses the potential endogeneity between long-term interest rates and the public
debt. A shock to the long-term interest rate can in￿uence the stock of public debt by
increasing interest expenses.13 Both to address this speci￿cs o u r c eo fe n d o g e n e i t y ,a n dt o
assuage concerns about additional omitted variables, in this table we estimate the models
considering all the regressors as endogenous. For presentation reasons, we also show IV
estimates for Sample A, but we focus on estimates for Sample B. I nf a c t ,b a s e do nt h e
results in Table 1 on the time series properties of the data, IV estimates are correct only
when Sample B is used. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 present results for a just identi￿ed model
where all variables are instrumented by their ￿rst lag. In columns 3 and 7, we instrument
the rhs variables with their ￿rst and second lag, while in columns 4 and 8 we use only the
second lag of the regressors and of the left-hand side variable as instruments. The estimates
of the coeﬃcients and their standard errors are very similar to the ones obtained when we
estimate models by DGLS or OLS.
13In pricinciple, the 10-year interest rate can also aﬀect the primary de￿cit by inducing policy makers to
implement changes in their spending and tax revenues￿ programs. Note, however, that the budget for the
current year is approved during the second half of the previous year and, even though additional measures
can be taken during the course of the year, they usually become eﬀective with some delay. Hence, the
primary de￿cit is much less likely to be an endogenous variable than the stock of public debt. Furthermore,
this type of endogeneity would likely bias our results towards ￿nding lower coeﬃcients, as ￿ if anything ￿
policymakers￿ response to higher rates will be to tighten the budget.
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Another important issue to be examined is the impact of ￿scal policy at the world level.
If economies are open and fully integrated with no barriers to trade or capital mobility, if
governments borrow in a common currency, and if governments￿ default risks are negligible,
the real interest rate in each country should depend only on measures of worldwide aggregate
￿scal policy, not on indicators of ￿scal policy in an individual country. From the individual
country￿s standpoint, ￿scal expansion is re￿ected primarily in a widening of the external
current account de￿cit and possibly a change in the exchange rate. In the simplest case, an
individual country￿s ￿scal policy aﬀects the interest rates it faces only to the extent that it
is aﬀects the worldwide macroeconomic balance - i.e. it would be only the ￿world￿ primary
de￿cit and ￿world￿ debt that matter. However, this simple theoretical result could break
down for a number of reasons: for instance, if capital mobility is limited; if goods market
mobility is limited (e.g. in cases in which exchange rate movements are associated with
changes in the relative price of tradables); if current ￿scal de￿cits are expected to be ￿nanced
partly through domestic in￿ation; or if the risk of government default is non-negligible.
It therefore seems desirable to examine empirically the hypothesis that an individual
country￿s ￿scal variables aﬀects the real interest rate only to the extent that they in￿uence
￿world￿ aggregate variables. To do this with the existing data set, we use average values
across OECD countries of the right-hand side variables as a proxy for ￿world￿ variables. An
obvious caveat is that the OECD is not, in fact, the world: it omits a sizable part of the
world economy which may have substantial aggregate savings. At the same time, OECD
aggregates do cover a substantial part of the world economy - and an even larger share of
global ￿nancial markets.
We construct ￿world￿ variables for each regressor and introduce these ￿world￿ indices
among the rhs variables. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 5, a ￿world￿ variable is equal to
the weighted average of the variable across all countries in the sample. Weights are based on
shares of real GDP measured in PPP terms.14 Note that the ￿world￿ variables constructed
in this way have a common value across all countries in the panel. For this reason, year
dummies cannot be included as controls in the empirical speci￿cations in columns 1, 2, 5,
and 6 of Table 5.
We estimate the models of Table 5, columns1 ,2 ,5 ,a n d6 ,i n c l u d i n gac o m m o nl i n e a r
14That is, we weight the value of the variable for country i in year t by the share of country i￿s real GDP
in the aggregate real GDP of the countries in the sample.
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the evidence on short-term real interest rates in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), we ￿nd that
both ￿world￿ ￿scal policy variables and an individual country￿s ￿scal variables matter for
long-term interest rates. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients of the ￿world￿ primary de￿cit and
￿world￿ public debt are sizeable. An increase by one percentage point of WPRDEF leads
to an increase in the interest rate of 10-year government bonds from a minimum of 28 basis
points to a maximum of 66 basis points, and an increase by the same amount of WGDEBT
raises interest rates from a minimum of 3 basis points of a maximum of 21 basis points. The
coeﬃcients are statistically signi￿cant at conventional critical values. Importantly, however,
t h es i z ea n dt h es i g n i ￿cance of the coeﬃcients of PRDEF, GDEBT,a n dGDEBT2 are
virtually unchanged from the evidence in the previous tables. Note also that results in Table
5 columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 do not change when we allow the linear and quadratic trend to be
country speci￿c. This implies that little if any of the impact of domestic de￿cits estimated
in the panel regressions reported earlier is channelled via the world economy.15
An alternative formulation is to construct a ￿rest of the world￿ (ROW) average vari-
ables that complement the individual country variables. This permits us to include year
￿xed eﬀects among the regressors and check that the evidence presented so far still holds.
Results with this formulation are reported in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. Consistently with our
previous results, individual countries￿ changes in the primary de￿cit to GDP ratio has always
a positive and statistically signi￿cant eﬀect on INT10Y , while the eﬀect of public debt is
positive (negative) when public debt is above( b e l o w )ag i v e nt h r e s h o l d . A sf o rt h ee ﬀect
of the ￿world￿ policy indicators, the coeﬃcient of the average value of the primary de￿cit
15We also investigated the existence of structural breaks for euro countries in 1999. In particular, for the
Euro-zone economies, one might expect that: (i) indicators of ￿scal policy in individual countries in￿uence
national interest rates before 1999 but not after, (ii) measures of aggregate ￿scal policy are the only ones
that matter after 1999. To test (i) and (ii), we de￿ned a dummy variable PEMU equal to 1 after 1999
for the countries in our panel that adopted the euro (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands) and equal to zero otherwise. We interacted the variable PEMU with the variables
PRDEF, GDEBT1o rGDEBT2 and their square and with WPRDEF and WGDEBT.W e e s t i m a t e d
columns 1 and 5 of Table 5 including these additional variables among the regressors. We also estimated
these speci￿cations eliminating the square of the variables. We did not ￿nd signi￿cant and robust evidence
that suggests the presence of a structural break in the relative importance of national and world ￿scal policy
variables before and after 1999. However, we also think that our experiment is not conclusive. There are at
least two caveats that one has to consider. First, the set of countries of the European Union that potentially
could have adopted the euro is diﬀerent from the one that ended up adopting the euro. Second, 1999 cannot
be the right date to identify the break if, for example, ￿nancial markets anticipated the adoption of the euro.
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November 2004is no longer signi￿cant, while the one of public debt is still positive and signi￿cant and its
value ranges from 0.096 to 0.115. In conclusion, we read the results in Table 5 as evidence
in favor of the international ￿nancial integration among OECD countries and the possibility
that ￿scal shocks in one country in￿uences interest rates in others. However, it seems that
either the degree of integration is far from perfect, or that there is a non-negligible risk that
de￿cits are re￿ected in expected in￿ation or default risk: changes in the domestic stance of
￿scal policy still matter for domestic long-term interest rates beyond their eﬀect on aggregate
variables.
3.5 Financial Development
In this section we bring into the picture indicators of ￿nancial development. The rationale for
this extension is twofold. First, ￿nancial development obviously potentially aﬀects the level of
interest rates, and if it is correlated with ￿scal policy it may generate a bias in our coeﬃcients.
This suggests that it is worthwhile to include ￿nancial development as an additional control.
Second, the degree of ￿nancial development may aﬀect the responsiveness of interest rates
to ￿scal shocks. This suggests that it may be interesting to include interactions among
the ￿scal variables and ￿nancial development. The range of ￿nancial development in this
OECD sample is comparatively limited; but even within this set of developed countries,
diﬀerences in the ￿nancial systems, and in the depth and liquidity of ￿nancial markets, can
have important eﬀects on the behavior of long-term interest rates.
We add among the regressors the variables used by Levine et al. (2000) to measure
￿nancial liberalization. Speci￿cally, we use the variable LIQUID LIABILITIES equal
to the liquid liabilities of the ￿nancial system as a share of GDP, the variable PRIVATE
CREDIT, equal to the value of credits by ￿nancial intermediaries to the private sector
divided by GDP, and the indicator COMMERCIAL − CENTRAL BANK, equal to the
ratio of commercial banks assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. In
Table 6 we show the results obtained when we add the ￿rst of the three variables. An increase
in ￿nancial liberalization leads to a decrease in the long-term interest rate and the coeﬃcient
of LIQUID LIABILITIES is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. More to the point
for our purposes, the eﬀect of changes in the primary de￿cit and public debt to GDP ratio
remains virtually unchanged. Results (nots h o w n )a r ea l o n gt h es a m el i n ei fw em e a s u r e
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variables and ￿nancial development. Here, we ￿nd that the degree of ￿nancial development
aﬀects the responsiveness of interest rates to changes in the primary-de￿cit-to GDP ratio: in
more developed ￿nancial markets, increases in the primary de￿cit-to-GDP ratio attenuate
the surge in long-term interest rates.
3.6 Alternative left-hand-side variables
We conclude this section by discussing the results we obtain by using a variety of alternative
left-hand-side variables.
We have re-estimated the relation between interest rates, the in￿ation rate, ￿scal
variables and GDP growth using real rather than nominal interest rates. Ideally, one would
like to measure the long term real interest rate as the diﬀerence between the 10-year nominal
interest rate and expectations of in￿ation of the next ten years. In￿a t i o n ￿ sf o r e c a s t so v e r
such a long-term time period are not available for our panel of countries. We follow Orr
et al. (1995) in proxying long-term in￿ation expectations by trend in￿ation.16 Our results
(shown in Table 7) are almost unchanged relatively to the ones in the speci￿cations using
nominal interest rates.
Second, we use as the dependent variable the nominal yield spread of 10-year gov-
ernment bonds over 3-month Treasury bills. Once again, as Table 8 shows, our conclusions
on the eﬀect of ￿scal policy on long-term interest rates are unaﬀected by this speci￿cation
change. Third, we use as our left-hand side variable the long-term interest rate series pub-
lished by the OECD, which is an average of the interest rates paid on long-term government
bonds. Fourth, we look at the spread between domestic 10 year interest rates and German
10 year interest rates. Again results (not shown but available upon request) still hold. One
popular left-hand-side variable in studies of the eﬀect of ￿s c a lv a r i a b l e si st h ey i e l ds p r e a d
of 10-year government bonds over swap contracts with the same maturity and currency de-
nomination. 17 The rationale for this choice of dependent variable is that it measures the
16We compute trend in￿ation using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter. We apply the ￿lter to each country in￿ation
rate using quarterly data and a value of λ equal to 1600. We then take the average over each year of the trend
in￿ation generated with quarterly data and calculate the 10-year real interest rate at a yearly frequency by
subtracting the average of trend in￿ation to the nominal interest rate. We also start with quarterly data
to compute the real 3-month interest rate as the diﬀerence between the nominal interest rate of 3-month
Treasury bills and the ex-post in￿ation rate. We then average over the year the quarterly data.
17Swap contracts are agreements to exchange a ￿ow of interest rates payments at a ￿xed rate for one at
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November 2004government￿s default risk. In Table 9, we show that ￿scal policy also aﬀects the 10-year
interest rate on swap contracts, which implies that ￿scal policy shocks aﬀect interest rates
also on instruments not issued by the government. In fact, if we use as our left-hand side
variable the spread of the 10-year government bond interest rate over the swap interest rate
we ￿nd that the coeﬃcients of PRDEF and GDEBT are not statistically signi￿cant. These
results may suggest that the impact of ￿scal policy on interest rates is not likely to be via
default risk directly, but could be through expected in￿ation (which can also be triggered
by an increase in sovereign default risk), or through the demand for loanable funds, both of
which would be expected to aﬀect the swap market in a similar way to the long-term bond
market.18
4 Dynamic Estimates
So far, our analysis has not allowed for the fact that ￿nancial markets are forward-looking
and, hence, react not only to ￿scal shocks in the current period, but also to the expectation
of future ￿scal policy. Moreover, coeﬃcients in tables shown so far do not capture the full
impact of changes in ￿scal policy on long-term interest rates, because we have not accounted
for the eﬀects that ￿scal variables have on long-term rates through their potential in￿uence
on the short-term rate, the in￿a t i o nr a t ea n dt h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fG D P .
In this section, we attempt to address these issues by estimating a vector autoregres-
sive system including the 10-year government bonds interest rate, the 3-month Treasury bills
interest rate, the in￿ation rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the primary de￿cit-to-GDP ratio
and the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We set the lag length of the system to 2 and, following
Alesina et al. (2002), we estimate the VAR on the entire panel.19 We then study the impulse
response function of the long-term interest rate to a shock to the primary de￿c i to rp u b l i c
debt at the time of the shock and in the following years.20
a ￿oating rate. For papers that use the interest rate of swap contracts to measure governments￿ default risk
see, for example, Afonso and Strauch (2003), Bernoth et al. (2003), Codogno et al. (2003), Favero et al.
(1997), and Lemmen and Goodhart (1999).
18Data on swap contracts are not available before 1988 for countries in our sample. For this reason, we
present only estimates with Sample B in Table 9.
19To estimate the VAR, we demean the data from country and year averages to control for country and
time ￿xed eﬀects.
20Gale and Orszag (2002) note that studies that do not take expectations into account are biased toward
￿n d i n gn oe ﬀect because they do not account for the fact the ￿nancial markets are forward-looking. Also,
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shock, we need innovations that are mutually orthogonal. The reduced form innovations are
c l e a r l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t he a c ho t h e ra n das h o c kt ot h ep r i m a r yd e ￿cit (public debt) is not
really a shock to this variable but a linear combination of its structural shock and shocks
of the other variables included in the system. To identify the structural primary de￿cit and
public debt shocks, we use the Cholesky decomposition, and we orthogonalize the innovations
in several ways to check that our results are not unduly sensitive to the order with which we
choose variables to enter the system.
We consider two extreme cases. First, we assume that ￿scal policy variables ￿come
￿rst￿, followed by the in￿a t i o nr a t e ,t h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fG D P ,t h e3 - m o n t hT r e a s u r y
bills interest rate and the 10-year government bonds interest rate (Table 10, parts Ia and
Ib). Second, we consider the case in which INT3M is ordered ￿rst, followed by INFL,
GROWTH, PRDEF, GDEBT,a n dINT10Y (Table 10, parts IIa and IIb). Within each
case, we consider both the sub-case with the primary de￿cit ￿coming before￿ public debt
(Table 10 parts Ia and IIa) and the sub-case with public debt ￿coming before￿ the primary
de￿cit (Table 10 parts Ib and IIb). We also checked (and con￿r m )t h a tr e s u l t sa r es i m i l a r
to the ones in Table 10 when we exchange the order of INFL and GROWTH.21
Table 10 displays the changes in the 10-year government bond interest rate following
a shock to the primary de￿cit and public debt by one percentage point, on impact and up
to ten years, and the cumulative change after the ￿rst ￿ve and ten years.
A positive shock to the ratio of primary de￿cit to GDP leads to an increase in INT10Y
o f7b a s i sp o i n t so ni m p a c t ,a n dt oac u m u l a t i v ei n c r e a s eo f6 6a n d1 4 6b a s i sp o i n t sa f t e r￿ve
works based on time series evidence from the US that measures expectations through a vector autoregression
tend to ￿nd smaller and less robust eﬀects than studies that include measures of forecasted ￿scal variables
from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) or the Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB). While
forecasts from a VAR are based only on past information on variables of the system, forecasts from the
CBO or the OMB also use other information as, for example, information on proposed changes in tax and
spending legislation.
To the best of our knowledge, long-horizon forecasts of future ￿scal policy variables are not available for
our large panels. Renhart and Sack (2000) use the budget surplus forecasted for the following year by the
OECD from 1981 onwards. But we ￿nd no study using panel data on OECD countries that includes 5-year
ahead and/or 10-year ahead projections of the de￿cit and the public debt. Hence, we cannot follow the
literature on the US (see for example Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), and Laubach (2003)) and we can
only account for expectations estimating a VAR system.
21The use of yearly data prevents us from adopting the identi￿cation assumptions in Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), and Perotti (2002).
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we obtain in the static models, but since the eﬀect persists over time, the cumulative response
of the long-term interest rate after ￿v ea n dt e ny e a r si sq u i t es i z e a b l e .T h i sp r o v i d e se v i d e n c e
in line with Feldstein (1986) who emphasizes the importance of considering expectations
about the stance of future ￿scal policy in measuring the eﬀect of the government de￿cit on
interest rates. The coeﬃcients are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Increases in public debt, in general, lead to lower interest rates on impact and in a few
years after the shock occurs. However, the eﬀect becomes positive as time goes by and the
cumulative response ten years after the shock is often positive and statistically signi￿cant.
In line with the results from the static models, the magnitude of the eﬀe c t si ss m a l l e rt h a n
the one due to a change in the primary de￿cit. Finally, note that, while the response of
INT10Y to a shock to the primary de￿cit is not unduly sensitive to the orthogonalization
procedure, the coeﬃcients of GDEBT are quite diﬀerent in size according to the strategy
used to identify the structural shocks. This consideration calls for considerable caution in
interpreting these dynamic results.
5 Conclusions
This paper has used cross-country empirical analysis to establish that ￿scal de￿cits and
the accumulated public debt aﬀect interest rates. The eﬀects are both statistically and
economically signi￿cant, and they are robust to a variety of speci￿cations. These eﬀects
are non-linear, becoming stronger as a country￿s debt grows and its ￿scal balance becomes
weaker. The dynamic analysis presented also shows that the long-run eﬀects of sustained
de￿cits are much larger than the immediate impact of a one-time de￿cit. These results imply
that the return to ￿scal laxity that has taken place in several major industrial countries in
recent years is potentially worrisome.
Fiscal policy has important eﬀects at the worldwide level, but it also has important
eﬀects at the level of the individual country. These results suggest that, while each country￿s
￿scal imbalance has its greatest impact at home, it is also a legitimate concern at the level
of the world economy.
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